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A

recent, high-profile investigation involving McKinsey
& Company (McKinsey)

and its contracts with the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) (see the
article, “McKinsey & Company’s Alleged
Conflicts of Interest at the Heart of the
Opioid Epidemic,” on page 20 of this
issue) has reminded us that organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) are
an integrity issue that never should
be written off as a check-the-box
exercise during the procurement
process. This incident highlighted
the need to address critical gaps in
this area of the law.
The U.S. government procurement
system aspires to obtain the best
goods and services, from the best
private sector firms, at the best
prices. To attain these goals and
safeguard taxpayer dollars, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) makes
clear that government procurement
demands the highest commitment
to ethical and unbiased conduct. As
noted in FAR 3.101-2:

Organizational
Conflicts
of Interest:
Cautionary Tales
Maintaining integrity in the contracting profession
is essential.
By Jessica Tillipman
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“Government business shall be conducted
in a manner above reproach and … with
complete impartiality and with preferential
treatment for none. Transactions relating
to the expenditure of public funds require
the highest degree of public trust and an
impeccable standard of conduct.”

To maintain integrity in
procurement, entities that do business
with the government are subject to
a patchwork of requirements, restrictions, and compliance obligations.
In my anti-corruption and
compliance course at The George
Washington University Law School,
I refer to this patchwork as the
NC M A

COMPLIANT
CONTRACTING

U.S. government procurement

“…because of other activities or relationships

anti-corruption ecosystem – a

with other persons, a person is unable

framework designed to prevent,

or potentially unable to render impartial

one procurement, the contractor

detect, and mitigate corruption risks

assistance or advice to the government, or the

has helped set the procurement’s

in government procurement. The

person’s objectivity in performing the contract

ground rules, such as writing the

framework includes principles and

work is or might otherwise be impaired, or a

statement of work or developing

critical tools such as transparency

person has an unfair competitive advantage.”

specifications, for another procure-

and oversight, whistleblower

ment.
3. Unequal access to information

protections and debarment, and civil

The term “person” includes

and criminal laws addressing a wide

companies and other contracting

– might occur when a contractor

range of inappropriate and unethical

entities. The current framework for

obtains access to nonpublic

business practices.

analyzing whether an OCI exists

information as part of its contract

derives primarily from FAR Subpart

performance giving it an advan-

designed to accomplish four goals:

9.5 and decisional precedent from the

tage in a later competition for a

(1) maintain integrity in interactions

Government Accountability Office

government contract.

with government officials, (2)

(GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal

FAR 9.504 requires a CO to

promote fairness, transparency, and

Claims (COFC).

This anti-corruption ecosystem is

competition, (3) ensure contractors

“identify and evaluate potential

Although OCIs have been

organizational conflicts of interest

are honest in their exchanges with the

regulated since the 1960s, they have

as early in the acquisition process

government, and (4) help maintain

garnered increased attention in

as possible; and avoid, neutralize, or

integrity throughout the supply chain.

recent decades. This is due, among

mitigate significant potential conflicts

One of the most critical integrity

other things, to consolidation in the

before contract award.” To fulfill this

concerns in government acquisition

information technology and defense

obligation, COs depend on contractors

is conflicts of interest. The FAR deals

industries, and the government’s

to disclose, among other things, “any

with them in two ways: by regulating

increased reliance on contractors

facts that may cause a reasonably

personal conflicts of interest (PCIs)

to provide services traditionally

prudent person to question the

and organizational conflicts of

performed by public servants,

contractor’s impartiality because

interest (OCIs). PCIs are regulated

“especially where the contractor is

of the appearance or existence of

under FAR Part 3, along with other

tasked with providing advice to the

bias.” Agencies generally demand

improper business practices.

government.” Experience suggests

this information through solicitation

In contrast, the FAR provisions

that OCIs are more likely to occur in

provisions or contract clauses that

relating to OCIs reside in FAR Part

contracts involving certain services

clearly articulate the government’s

9 – Contractor Qualifications.

such as management support services

expectations regarding the disclosure

Perhaps because of the way the FAR

and consultant or other professional

of facts and circumstances that would

categorizes conflicts of interest, there

services.

give rise to an actual or potential OCI.

is a perception that whereas PCIs

OCIs are generally separated into

Unlike many other provisions

are an improper business practice,

three categories:

in the FAR that ensure compliance

OCIs are just another routine factor

1. Impaired objectivity – may arise

through standard solicitation provi-

that contracting officers (COs) must

where a contractor’s outside

sions and contract clauses found in

consider before awarding a contract.

business relationships create an

FAR Subpart 52, the FAR contains no

economic incentive to provide

mandatory OCI solicitation provision

biased advice under a government

or contract clause. Instead, agencies

contract.

have developed their own language.

Organizational Conflicts of
Interest
The FAR defines an OCI as occurring
when:
NC M A

2. Biased ground rules – can occur
when, as part of its work under

For example, FDA contracts may
contain the following:
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The contractor warrants that, to the best of

primarily to COs, contractors play a

under its government contracts.

the contractor’s knowledge and belief, there

significant role in communicating with

The policies underlying OCI rules as

are no relevant facts or circumstances which

the CO to mitigate or avoid potential

outlined in the article, “Developing

would give rise to an organizational conflict

OCIs. Moreover, “an effective mitigation

an Organizational Conflicts of

of interest, as defined in FAR Subpart 9.5, and

plan may enable a contractor to

Interest Framework,” published in

that the contractor has disclosed all relevant

perform engagements for which it

the American Bar Association Public

information regarding any actual or potential

otherwise would not be available.”

Contract Law Journal, emphasize why

conflict. The contractor agrees it shall make

preventing and mitigating conflicts of

an immediate and full disclosure, in writing,

The McKinsey Case

to the contracting officer of any potential

On April 13, 2022, the House Commit-

or actual organizational conflict of interest

tee on Oversight and Reform released

“The failure of a procurement system to address

or the existence of any facts that may cause

an interim report (conflicts report) that

OCIs appropriately can undermine both its

a reasonably prudent person to question

found, among other things, that McK-

legitimacy and anti-corruption goals and may

the contractor’s impartiality because of the

insey consultants worked on FDA con-

have other undesirable effects … OCIs can also

appearance or existence of bias or an unfair

tracts while also working for the opioid

reduce the quality and value of the services a

competitive advantage.

manufacturers regulated by the FDA

government receives, because organizations

without disclosing this information to

with OCIs may have competing loyalties that

the agency (See the article, “McKinsey &

could undermine the quality of their advice to

required by an applicable OCI clause

Company’s Alleged Conflicts of Interest

the government. Divided loyalties may include

can lead to a multitude of adverse

at the Heart of the Opioid Epidemic,” on

conflicting interests such as maximizing

consequences, including, but not

page 20 of this issue).

profit versus rendering candid advice to the

Failure to disclose the information

limited to contract termination,

The report describes in detail the

this nature are so important:

government. In circumstances where providing

prosecution for the making of false

overlap between McKinsey’s work for

impartial advice may be against organizational

statements (including fines and

the FDA and its opioid manufacturer

self-interest, the procuring organization faces

imprisonment), and suspension or

clients. It also contains a description

performance risk.”

debarment. In addition, a false OCI

of how nearly two dozen McKinsey

certification could trigger potential

consultants (including senior partners)

liability under the False Claims

“worked for both FDA and opioid

are often very difficult to mitigate,

Act, resulting in treble damages

manufacturers on related topics,

particularly where the conflict

and penalties. The submission of

including at the same time.” The

permeates nearly every aspect of

false claims also can be criminally

report also notes that McKinsey never

the government contract. Moreover,

prosecuted. Criminal penalties for

disclosed the potential conflicts to the

COs tend to reject mitigation plans

submitting false claims include

FDA, despite the presence of language

when contractors fail to implement or

imprisonment and fines.

in McKinsey’s FDA contracts requiring

monitor compliance with them (i.e.,

Notably, “impaired objectivity” OCIs

it to disclose “any facts that may

when employees breach firewalls to

consequences for failure to disclose an

cause a reasonably prudent person to

obtain a competitive advantage in a

actual or potential OCI, most sophis-

question the contractor’s impartiality.”

procurement).

ticated contractors take affirmative

The information presented in the

Given the potentially severe

steps to identify possible conflicts

report raises significant red flags of

of interest and, to the best of their

“impaired objectivity” OCIs, where

The Path Forward:
Compliance and Reform

ability, mitigate them. Mitigation can

there is concern that the contractor’s

The McKinsey report is a compel-

include developing firewalls, executing

other business relationships (including

ling case study in how conflicts and

non-disclosure agreements, or shifting

those with private sector clients),

compliance issues could significantly

work to a neutral, unaffiliated third

“could create an incentive for a

undermine the public’s confidence

party. Although FAR Subpart 9.5 speaks

contractor to provide biased advice”

in our procurement system and the
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contractors that provide critical goods

remains a necessity in reducing risk,

would be expected to dedicate a

and services. Although it is tempting to

ensuring compliance with the law,

greater proportion of their compliance

view this situation in a vacuum, the les-

and sustaining a culture that promotes

resources to them.

sons have broader repercussions for the

ethical conduct.

government contracting community.
First, it reminds contractors how

A robust and proactive approach to

Many of the world’s largest

OCI compliance likely would include:

government contractors have

Ɂ Clear and accessible policies and

important ethics and compliance

dedicated significant resources to

procedures to identify OCI risks and

programs are in reducing risks

“promote and advance a culture of

requirements.

associated with identifying, mitigating,

ethical conduct in every company

and disclosing OCIs.

that provides products and services

to ensure practices are compliant

through government contracting.”

and consistent with internal

Recognizing that an ethical

policies and regulatory/contractual

Second, it has highlighted the urgency
of overhauling FAR OCI regulations.

Reducing OCI Risk Through
Ethics and Compliance

Ɂ Processes and internal controls

transgression by one government

requirements.

contractor has the potential to

Ɂ Regular testing to assess the

negatively impact all government

effectiveness of internal controls

The issues highlighted in the McKinsey

contractors, organizations such as the

related to OCI compliance.

report must be considered against the

Defense Industry Initiative (DII) and

backdrop of a growing global consen-

the International Forum for Business

sus on what constitutes an effective

Ethical Conduct (IFBEC) are dedicated

corporate ethics and compliance pro-

to establishing and improving business

gram. Since 2004, increased attention

ethics and compliance programs in the

requirements, with more extensive

has been devoted to internal compli-

government contracts industry. The

training for employees most

ance and ethics programs designed to

efforts of DII and IFBEC are buttressed

likely to encounter or manage

prevent, detect, and mitigate ethics

by organizations such as the Society

OCI-related issues.

and corruption risks in the course of

of Corporate Compliance and Ethics

a company’s business activities. Given

(SCCE), which support ethics and

the heightened corruption risks and

compliance professionals across all

compliance obligations associated with

industries.

government contracts, most sophis-

Ɂ Remediation of identified
weaknesses in policies, procedures,

Ɂ Ensuring senior management’s
words and actions demonstrate a
commitment to OCI compliance.
Ɂ Requiring and encouraging

Contractors must develop policies

ticated government contractors have

and procedures tailored to the unique

invested heavily in ethics and compli-

risks they face. A truly risk-tailored

ance programs to reduce these risks.

compliance program recognizes that

FAR 52.203-13 requires contractors

or practices.
Ɂ Firm-wide training on OCI

employees to identify and report
facts that could give rise to a
potential OCI.
Ɂ Conducting a rigorous OCI analysis

not all risks are equal and devotes

before submitting proposals and

to (1) adopt a written code of

more time to policing high-risk areas.

fully complying with OCI reporting

business ethics and conduct which

For example, given the risks associated

must be made available to each

with a contractor’s failure to properly

employee engaged in performance

identify, mitigate, and disclose

safeguard nonpublic information

of the contract, (2) maintain an

potential OCIs, most contractors

acquired or accessed during the

ongoing business ethics awareness

have dedicated compliance policies,

performance of a government

and compliance program, and (3)

procedures, and controls designed to

contract.

develop an internal control system.

effectively manage this risk. Moreover,

Even for contractors that fall outside

in light of the heightened OCI risks

Merely adopting an OCI policy is

the coverage of this FAR provision,

associated with contracts involving

not enough. The effectiveness of an

implementing and maintaining a

management support and consulting,

institution’s ethics and compliance

strong ethics and compliance program

contractors providing such services

program depends upon whether it

NC M A

obligations.
Ɂ Maintaining stringent controls to
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is followed in practice. Ethics and

opposed to their personal interests or those of

could be tailored if appropriate

compliance professionals disparage

the contractor who employs them, there is a

(rather than relying on agency-spe-

“paper programs” that appear robust

risk that inappropriate decisions will be made.

cific solicitation provisions and

but are neither implemented nor

contract clauses).
Over a decade ago, audits and

followed in practice.

Ɂ Enhancing Protections Related to

studies identified significant issues

Contractor Access of Nonpublic

or deviation from policies and proce-

stemming from the government’s

Information: Citing government

dures does not necessarily mean that

increased reliance on contractors

reports that raised concerns

a compliance program is ineffective;

to provide services traditionally

regarding the safeguarding of

no entity is immune from human

performed by public servants.

nonpublic information companies

transgression. However, evidence of

Although progress has been made,

obtain while performing

a systemic disregard for compliance

many issues persist.

government contracts, the FAR

To be clear, an occasional violation

In 2011, the FAR Council engaged

policies and procedures, particularly

Council proposed new clauses to

when committed by senior leaders,

in a thoughtful and somewhat

contractually obligate contractors

is often strong evidence of a weak

herculean task of attempting to refine

to protect all nonpublic infor-

compliance culture.

the OCI rules. Although the proposed

mation they access during contract

rule never was implemented and

performance. The FAR Council also

ultimately was withdrawn (10 years

proposed requiring all employees

In addition to highlighting an alleged

later on March 19, 2021), it addressed

who might access nonpublic

compliance failure, the McKinsey re-

numerous outstanding issues,

information to sign nondisclosure

port shed light on the need to update

including:

agreements enforceable by both

FAR OCI provisions, which have re-

Ɂ Relocating the FAR’s OCI

the government and third-party

Modernizing OCI Regulations

mained largely unchanged since 1984.

Provisions: After concluding

The current language in FAR 9.5 no

that OCI issues are more closely

longer reflects modern procurement

aligned with business practice

The McKinsey report reminds us

practices and the sophisticated body of

than contractor qualifications,

that we need to revisit this effort – not

OCI case law that has developed over

the proposed rule recommended

only to bring greater clarity to the

the past several decades. Moreover,

relocating the FAR’s OCI provisions

existing regulations, but to create a

the existing guidance fails to address

from FAR 9.5 to a new FAR Subpart

more uniform approach across federal

the growing risks associated with the

3.12.

agencies to the risks associated with

government’s increasing reliance on

Ɂ Amending Existing FAR Coverage

information owners.

OCIs and the protection of nonpublic

contractors to provide services that

and Introducing New Solicitation

include advice and the exercise of

Provisions and Contract Clauses:

judgment.

Recognizing the need to assist

deficiencies in the current OCI

As noted in a 2007 Report of the

information.
Recognizing the need to address

COs in implementing OCI policy,

regulatory framework, Congress

Acquisition Advisory Panel to the

the FAR Council recommended

recently has introduced legislation

Office of Federal Procurement Policy

amending existing FAR coverage

that directs the FAR Council to address

and the United States Congress:

to clarify key terms and provide

these outstanding issues. These bills

28

more detailed guidance regarding

are a step forward in strengthening

“[T]he trend toward more reliance on

how COs should identify and

OCI policy.

contractors … raises the possibility that the

address OCIs. It also introduced

government’s decision-making processes

new solicitation provisions and

Conclusion

can be undermined … [u]nless the contractor

contract clauses after determining

Unlike headline-generating topics

employees performing these tasks are focused

that it would be beneficial to have

such as bribery and fraud, OCIs are of-

upon the interests of the United States, as

standard language in the FAR that

ten viewed as a highly technical litiga-
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tion issue that rarely garners attention
outside of law firm client advisories.

7

The McKinsey report reminds us that
OCIs are an integrity issue and have
the potential to undermine the quality
and value of services the government

8
9
10

receives. When taxpayer dollars are at
stake, a contractor’s undivided loyalties
are paramount.

11

Fortunately, the McKinsey incident
has spurred legislative action and
increased attention to ethics and
integrity, which may result in
strengthening a regulatory regime
long overdue for reform. CM
Jessica Tillipman is the assistant dean for
government procurement law studies and
government contracts advisory council
professorial lecturer in government contracts
law, practice and policy at The George
Washington University Law School. She
teaches Anti-Corruption & Compliance,
a course that focuses on anti-corruption,
ethics, and compliance issues in government
procurement. She would like to thank
Jacquelyn Sherman for her assistance with
the preparation of this article.
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